Human Security in the Russian Federation

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the development of human security in the Russian Federation during the first twenty years of transition in seven main interconnected dimensions: socio-economic security, health security, personal liberties and security, political security, cultural identity and security, migration and security, and environmental security. It asks what has been the impact of the oil-led economic growth that has characterised the Russian Federation in recent years, but also what are the negative repercussions of the global financial crisis for the human security of citizens. The key argument put forward in this article is that an asymmetrical development in human security has taken place during the first two decades of transition. The oil-led economic boom improved the human security of citizens in some specific dimensions directly linked to the economic performance of the country, but not in others where the state-centric approach to modernisation has often resulted in a loss of individual security and liberties. If compared to the communist period, the overall human security situation of the country has increased, but substantial progress still has to be made, especially if the possible disruptive consequences of the global financial crisis are fully taken into account.

Keywords: Russian Federation, human security, democratisation, consolidation of democratic institutions, oil-led social policy.

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In order to elucidate this argument, a literature review of the main changes in the seven dimensions of human security mentioned above has been undertaken along with a more in-depth analysis of citizens’ attitudes and responses. The investigation is based on the fourth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) (European Social Survey Round 4 Data, 2008), with field work conducted in the Russian Federation from November 2008 to April 2009 (see Table 1). The fourth wave of the ESS survey allows, in this context, not simply an unprecedented exploration of the most recent social attitudes of Russian citizens, but it also provides the first overview of citizens’ reactions to the effects of the global financial crisis.
Table 1: European Social Survey 4 Round (Russian Federation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Collector</th>
<th>CESSI (Institute for Comparative Social Research), Moscow, Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode of data collection</td>
<td>Computer assisted personal interview and face-to-face interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field work period(s)</td>
<td>08.11.08 - 09.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling procedure</td>
<td>Stratified four-stage probability cluster sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of valid interviews</td>
<td>2,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate main questionnaire</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>Calculations weighted by design and population weight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The article is structured as follows. Section one introduces the human security concept, highlighting its main constituting elements while emphasising at the same time its importance for the social sciences. Section two investigates human security in action in the specific context of the Russian post-communist transition. Here, the most recent developments in the seven dimensions of human security are critically assessed. Section three goes on to discuss the repercussions of the oil-led economic growth on the human security of Russian citizens, exploring also its repercussions for the process of democratisation and consolidation of democratic institutions recently established. In the conclusion, a final evaluation of the human security of Russian citizens is conducted. Here, the limits and prospects for the future are highlighted.

**HUMAN SECURITY: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONCEPT**

The concept of human security has attracted increasing scholarly attention, but it has also not been immune to critiques. On the one hand, human security has been addressed as one of the most valuable and comprehensive conceptual instruments for improving the living conditions and quality of life of individuals worldwide (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006). On the other, human security has also been accused of over generality (Paris, 2001). Similar to the concept of human rights, human security has, in this case, been described as embracing too many distinct aspects of the individuals’ life and, for this reason, impossible to grasp and to operationalise as an instrument. What follows emphasises, by contrast, the importance of the human security concept for the study of modern democracies, particularly because of, and not in spite of, its multidimensional character.

Several different reasons can be brought up in defence of the human security concept. First, human security, as an all-embracing conceptual instrument, does not limit its scope and coverage to one dimension of security (such as socio-economic security) at the expenses of others (such as political security), but it examines the security of citizens from a broader perspective including several different angles (for an operationalisation of the concept see discussion below). Second, human security shifts the attention from nations to individuals. As a concept born in the post Cold-War era, human security changes, in this way, the order of priorities, from national security issues *strictu sensu* to human security issues. Human
security is relevant, in this context, also because it changes the attention from the welfare of a nation (e.g. market production) to the welfare of the individuals (e.g. their income and distribution of wealth).] Third, human security takes into consideration a sustainable development perspective in the investigation of economic and societal change. It emphasises, in this case, both the side of ‘being protected’ in this specific moment, as well as ‘not being exposed’ to danger in the future. Fourth, human security includes also a human rights dimension. It provides clearer possibilities for measuring the progress of developed and developing countries, while it highlights, at the same time, the real living conditions of citizens. Last but not least, human security takes into account important issues related to the process of democratisation and of consolidation of democratic institutions. It analyses, in this case, the institutional performance of a country, but it also keeps track of the ‘democratic benefits’ really enjoyed by the citizens (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006; Burgess et al., 2007; UNESCO, 2009).

Human security is, therefore, a useful multi-dimensional concept, which includes several spheres of our private and public life. In Burgess et al. (2007), seven main dimensions capable of affecting the human security of the individuals have been identified. These correspond to: (1) socio-economic security; (2) health security; (3) personal liberties and security; (4) political security; (5) cultural identity and security; (6) migration and security; and (7) environmental security. Very briefly, socio-economic security includes the individual’s access to decent material standards; health security is the right to decent health (including health care services); personal liberties and security involve the freedom of the individual to express their opinions without restraint, but also incorporates the protection against any form of discrimination; political security is the defence against any form of political oppression; cultural identity and security concerns the respect and protection of the individual cultural peculiarities; migration and security involves the right of the individual to move and to be protected as a migrant; and, finally, environmental security is the protection against environmental threats.

As will be shown in this article, an investigation of these seven interconnected dimensions can also be useful in evaluating the democratic performance of a country and the consolidation of its democratic institutions. Presently, the evaluation of the quality of a democracy has primarily been concerned with an assessment of the institutional structures that permit a democratic system to be reproduced over time (Diamond & Morlino, 2005). Very little attention has, however, been given to a multi-dimensional assessment of the democratic deficits and benefits of a nation. As Claus Offe has correctly highlighted (2003), there are some basic democratic functions that a state is called to ensure. These correspond to the necessity of ensuring decent living standards to the citizens (the demos), but this cannot be conducted at the expense of other important democratic functions, such as those that involve the political and individual freedoms of the individual.

HUMAN SECURITY IN ACTION

Socio-Economic Security

Socio-economic security is the first and perhaps most important dimension of the human security concept. In general terms, socio-economic security can be described as an ‘equal and durable access to similar and decent living standards in a stable socio-economic environment’, but this definition is not exhaustive. Despite the existence of possible shortcomings (how do we define equal, durable, similar, decent and stable?), this description has a positive
side, in that it adds to the broader explanation of ‘human security’ (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006; Burgess et al., 2007; Tadjbakhsh & Tomescu-Hatto, 2007), often described as ‘freedom from fear, freedom from want’ (Amouyel, 2006), and to a less comprehensive definition of ‘social security’. In this sense, socio-economic security can be seen as a possibility of providing individuals with the chances of conducting not only a good quality life in a specific moment, but rather through the entire course of their existence, ensuring that individuals are not forced to seriously worry about their personal conditions dramatically worsening in the near future due to changing economic circumstances (Burgess et al., 2007, ch. 1).

In the Russian Federation the economic transformations that have occurred since 1989 have been drastic and have resulted in important negative repercussions for the socio-economic security of citizens. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has drastically decreased during the first years of transition, recovering only in recent years. Unemployment, once an unknown problem (or rather hidden by officials) has also grown as a result of transition (UNICEF, 2008; Rosstat, 2009; see also Table 2). This has, however, been not the only negative result of transition. To this list of difficulties that current Russians have been called to face, under-employment, late and/or inadequate pay should also be added (Manning & Tikhonova, 2004; Cook, 2007). The transition toward a market economy has also had important negative socio-demographic consequences. Total fertility rates have substantially decreased since the collapse of communism, while life expectancy at birth has declined from 69.6 years in 1989 to 66.6 years in 2006 (WHO, 2009). The drastic socio-economic changes have produced important negative repercussions in terms of poverty and income inequality. Income inequality has exploded, with the Russian Federation now placed among the world’s most unequal societies (UNDP, 2008). As far as poverty is concerned, although drastically decreased since the first years of transition, in 2008 19 million Russians still lived below the minimum subsistence level. This corresponds to 13.5 percent of the total population (Rosstat, 2009).

The collapse of the central planned economy has implied a drastic restructuring of the communist welfare state, touching all spheres of social protection. Here, four main trends are identifiable: (1) privatisation of provisions; (2) individualisation of risks; (3) monetisation of access; and (4) decentralisation of management. These four main trends have, more specifically, taken the form of: (a) the reintroduction (or strengthening) of the social insurance principle in the overall social security system; (b) privatisation and differentiation of benefits in the pension and health care sector; (c) the establishment of a residual system of protection against unemployment coupled with a basic safety net of social assistance provisions for the poorest social strata; and (d) the introduction of a private market in the education and housing sector (Cook, 2007; Cerami, 2009).

Welfare restructuring has been one of the most controversial reforms of the post-communist transition. A large section of the Russian population remains unprotected when not active in the labour market or poorly protected when employed in atypical jobs or in the informal economy (Cerami, 2010a). Incorrect policy advice of the international financial institutions (most notably the World Bank and the IMF), which have primarily focused on macro-economic stabilisation measures neglecting the social dimension of reforms (Stiglitz, 2002), have also worsened an already disastrous situation.

It comes then as no surprise that in terms of socio-economic security Russian citizens have seen their situation becoming more difficult as a result of the transformation, especially during the first decade of transition. After the economic crisis of 1998, the rise in oil and energy prices has greatly improved the economic and redistributive performance of the
Russian state. As argued by Cerami (2009), an ‘oil-led social policy’ has been the key characteristic of the ‘Russian Miracle’ favouring not only a fast, even though still fragile, economic recovery, but also providing the population at large (and not only the nouveaux riches) the first tangible benefits of the transition towards a market economy. The most recent global economic crisis, which has resulted in a drastic fall in oil and energy prices, has called into question the positive achievements obtained. As shown in Table 2, after a difficult economy recovery from 1998 to 2008, GDP growth has now dramatically decreased (-10.4 percent in 2009), while also industrial production has witnessed substantial losses. This has clear repercussions also in terms of unemployment, expected to grow in the following years.

Table 2: Oil-Led Economic Growth

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP, %-change</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-10.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Oil Prices (Brent USD)</td>
<td>9.2/</td>
<td>20.8/</td>
<td>40.0/</td>
<td>33.9/</td>
<td>39.5/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum/ Highest</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>145.1</td>
<td>57.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, $ billion</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>243.6</td>
<td>471.8</td>
<td>125.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, oil, oil products, natural gas, $ billion</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>148.9</td>
<td>310.1</td>
<td>76.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports, $ billion</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>125.3</td>
<td>292.0</td>
<td>-82.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial production, %-change</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-14.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Needless to say, the negative consequences of the global financial crisis can have important destabilising functions. Up to present date, however, the attitudes of Russian citizens concerning the prospects for the future are ambivalent. As shown in Figure 1, approximately one-third of Russians think that it is ‘not very likely’ (20 percent) or ‘not at all likely’ (10 percent) to become unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 months, against approximately one-fifth who believe it is ‘likely’ (15 percent) or ‘very likely’ (7 percent). More positive seems to be the situation in case of future pensions. Here, 47 percent of all respondents affirm to ‘be able to afford to increase the level of old age pension’ they currently have against 34 percent who will be able to ‘afford the present level but not to increase it’ (see Figure 2).
Health Security

Health security represents, in this context, a second aspect of human security, strictly associated to the socio-economic development of a nation. The wealth of a nation, even though difficult to measure, can also be seen by the health status of its population, with less developed countries characterised by low life expectancy, higher mortality and morbidity rates. The relationship between the wealth of a nation and health is, however, not one-sided, but rather
a circular relation. Poor economic development almost unambiguously leads to a deterioration of the health status of the population due, for example, to a lack of resources available for food, safe working environment and access to basic health services. However, the poor health status of the population can also negatively impact upon the economic performance of the country. People with a poor health status have, simply put, less time and possibilities to dedicate to their job, with their performance also drastically decreasing with the duration and seriousness of their illness. The negative repercussions of the HIV/AIDS crisis in the South-African labour market is the most powerful example (Vass, 2005) of such a circular relationship.

The systemic transformation that has taken place in the Russian Federation has had unprecedented negative consequences for the health status of the population (Manning & Tikhonova, 2004, 2009). Statistics provided by the World Health Organization show, for example, that mortality rates have steadily increased, from 1,160 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1989 to 1,402 in 2006. Alcohol abuse has also grown as a result of transition. The pure alcohol consumption (litres per capita) in the Russian Federation has almost doubled (from 5.3 in 1989 to 8.9 in 2006). Similarly, the number of suicide and self-inflicted injuries has increased, corresponding closely with negative impact of economic crisis. It has grown from 26 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1989 to 38 in 1999. Again, after the economic recession, it has decreased to 27 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2006. HIV/AIDS has become a further major problem. The number of new HIV infections has grown from 272 in 1989 to 39,207 in 2006 surpassing many third-world countries. As emphasised by all international institutions (notably, the OECD, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Health Organization), a reform of the health care sector must be conducted without delay (WHO, 2009; see also Titterton, 2006; Cook, 2007; Cerami, 2009; Manning & Tikhonova, 2009).

As far as the subjective health status of the population is concerned, and despite a deterioration of national indicators and increasing deficiencies in the health care sector (see Figure 3), the majority of Russian respondents still describe their general health as ‘fair’ (48 percent) or even as ‘good’ (29 percent) (see Figure 4). These results, however, should be taken with due caution. When a more in-depth analysis of these responses against the income status of the individual is conducted, the picture is substantially different. As shown in Table 3, subjective health greatly increases with the household income. 12 percent of individuals in the lowest income bracket find their subjective health ‘good’, against 24 percent of the second income bracket, 35 percent of the third, 35 percent of the fourth, 42 percent of the fifth income bracket.
Table 3: Subjective General Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Very bad</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Quintile</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Quintile</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Quintile</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Quintile</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Quintile</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey Round 4 Data 2008; Author’s calculations made on a sample of 2,512 respondents. Weighted by design and population weight. Original income deciles recoded into quintiles.

Figure 3: Satisfaction with Health Care Services (November 2008-April 2009)

Source: European Social Survey Round 4 Data 2008; Author’s calculations. Original scale of values recoded from a 10 point to a 5 point scale.
Personal Liberties and Security

Personal liberties and security are, unquestionably, among the most important elements for the human security of individuals. Personal liberties involve, for example, freedom of speech and association, but also several other freedoms including the protection against the law, the right of not being discriminated against because of ethnic, religious, and sexual orientation, and so on. Personal liberties and security are not given a priori in modern democracies, instead these rights need to be constantly defended and preserved. In this context, September 11 2001 has represented the beginning of a difficult moment for several western societies which have seen their human rights standards drastically reduced in the name of national security (Baufeld, 2005; Nguyen, 2005; Wiegand, 2008; Honigsberg, 2009).

The Russian Federation has not been immune to this trend, but has experienced internal tensions that have shaken the country in a particularly difficult way. During the twenty years subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Russian Federation has not simply been called to re-establish a functional economic system capable of providing basic subsistence to the citizens, but it has also been called to face several separatist requests from countries, which represented vital and strategic geopolitical and economic interests (as in the cases of Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine). This change in geo-political landscape has important repercussions for the feeling of security and safety that Russian citizens have. The key features of law and order that Russian citizens currently experience are substantially different from the ones they experienced during communism, where income and personal securities strictly depended on strong bureaucratic structures.

Figure 5 indicates the feeling of safety of Russian respondents. Here, an Index of Safety has been constructed by three different items: (1) feeling of safety walking alone at night; (2) worried about home being burgled; and (3) worried about becoming a victim of violent crime. As it can be immediately seen, the majority of Russian citizens feel relatively safe despite the increasing crime rates in the Russian Federation. 15 percent of respondents...
show indeed a ‘medium’ feeling of safety, while approximately 68 percent even a ‘high’ feeling of safety.

Figure 5: Index of Safety (November 2008-April 2009)

Political Security
Political security, as one of the most discussed issues in comparative politics, represents another crucial dimension for the human security concept. As with the concept of human security, the key features of political security are extremely difficult to grasp. For Wolfgang Merkel, and for the members of the project on ‘Defective Democracies’ (Merkel et al., 2003; Merkel, 2004), an analytical concept of democracy should also be concerned with identifying and defining the elements and conditions of political security. To achieve this objective, democracy is understood as internally and externally embedded in a wider socio-political environment. Internally, five different partial regimes secure the normative and functional existence of democracy. These correspond to: (a) the electoral regime; (b) political liberties; (c) civil rights; (d) horizontal accountability; and (e) effective power to govern. Externally, these partial regimes (or sub-regimes of democracy) are embedded in ‘spheres of enabling conditions for democracy that protect it from the outer as well as inner shocks and destabilizing tendencies’ (Merkel, 2004, p. 34). These correspond to: (i) stateness; (ii) civil society; and (iii) social and economic requisites.

To clarify, the electoral regime, the first of the five internal partial regimes, involves the institutional structures that allow open and free elections. Political liberties, the second internal partial regime, refers, by contrast, to the possibility of access to political communication and organization, while civil rights, the third partial regime, concern the possibility of being preserved from the ‘tyranny of majority’ (Tocqueville, 1985 [1835]). This involves the protection of life, freedom, property, the equal access to the law and equal treatment. The fourth partial regime, horizontal accountability, concerns, in this context, the so-often quoted ‘check and balance’ of powers. Here, what is intended is the observation of elected authorities by a network of independent and autonomous institutions as defined by the constitutions. Finally, the fifth partial regime, the effective power to govern, regards the effective possibility
that who has been elected is also the one who governs. This implies that no other forces, such as the military, come to change the rules of the game. According to Merkel (Merkel et al., 2003; Merkel, 2004, p. 43), these five partial regimes can only function effectively in a democracy if they are mutually internally and externally connected within each other as well as also with the other external spheres of democracy (stateness, civil society, social and economic requisites) influencing and supporting each other.

Timm Beichelt and Claudia Eicher (2006) have applied this concept of ‘embedded democracy’ to the case of the Russian Federation highlighting important deficiencies in each one of the five different partial regimes mentioned above. In terms of the electoral regime, as noted by numerous independent NGOs, elections in the Russian Federation have often scored low in comparison to internationally accepted standards for universal and free democratic elections. Political liberties are also insufficiently developed in the Russian Federation (Moser, 2001; Shevtsova, 2003; Beichelt & Eicher, 2006; Smyth, 2006). As in other Western countries, the media in the Russian Federation have been addressed as increasingly in the hands of national authorities (or private sector members with links to the government), which have prevented a totally free electoral competition (Beumers et al., 2008; Oates, 2006; Koltsova, 2009). This unbalance of powers has produced clear repercussions in terms of reduced civil rights, with demonstrations by civic society associations on several occasions forbidden by national authorities and leaders of opposition groups forced to stand down from the political competition. In terms of horizontal accountability, the Russian Federation is also characterised by most of the problems of young democracies with self-legitimising political elites whose actions have, on several instances, escaped judicial control (Research Centre for East European Studies, 2009a). Finally, in terms of effective power to govern, for several international observers the increasing efficiency of the executive power seems to have largely been achieved at the expense of several democratic liberties, with international NGOs calling the attention of the international community to a possible return to old forms of authoritarianism (Freedom House, 2007, 2008).

As it could be expected, due to the historical heritage, as well as the persistence of administrative corruption (Transparency International, 2008), Russian citizens still tend to show a general low level of trust when evaluating political institutions as a whole. Figure 6 provides the results of an Index of Political Trust which includes not only trust in the executive, but also trust in the parliament, legal system, politicians, and political parties. Interestingly, almost half of all respondents show a ‘low’ (46 percent) or ‘medium’ (45 percent) level of political trust.
Cultural Identity and Security

Cultural identity and security is another important dimension of human security related to human rights. As an extension of the principle of self-determination already expressed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cultural identity and security implies the security from not being discriminated against on the grounds of cultural differences. This also includes that the culture of a minority of which the member belongs to is preserved or not assimilated by the dominant national culture.

In the case of the Russian Federation, a large country made of numerous different ethnic, religious and cultural communities, historical legacies here play a crucial role. During communism, the Soviet system pursued contrasting policies that continue to have important repercussions. The Soviet system encouraged, at times, assimilation in the leading culture (e.g. Stalin policies) while it promoted, at others, an ambiguous mix with self-determination (e.g. Lenin and post-Stalin period) (Smith, 1990; Suny, 1998; Tuminez, 2003). The collapse of the Berlin Wall has not only let the pre-existing tensions emerge, increasing the independentist aspirations of some ex-Soviet republics, but it has also simultaneously increased the national pride and intolerance of Russian residents for people of different cultural backgrounds. In the case of the Russian Federation this has taken the clearest form in increasing intolerance against migrants, seen not simply as potential danger for the national economy (see below), but also as a possible threat to the dominant national culture. As shown in Figure 7, a clear majority of citizens (approximately 80 percent) think that the country’s cultural life is ‘undermined’ (34 percent) or ‘quite undermined’ (45 percent) by increasing migration.
Migration and Security

Migration, as another important aspect for the human security concept, has become one of the most crucial international issues. This increasing interest can be explained not simply by the increasing international flows of migrant individuals, but also by the continuous violation of basic human rights (such as the right of asylum or to social integration) carried out by the most industrialized nations (Carmel et al., 2010). Increasing poverty and income inequalities around the globe have resulted in increasing international relocation, which has found many western nations unprepared. While the right to look for asylum has been expressed in most European Constitutions, as well as in international agreements and declarations, its full implementation has, far too often, remained at the discretion of national authorities, which have sometimes put the respect of the basic human rights of migrants in third place after national economic and political security. As Dummet (1992) and Benhabib (2004) have correctly affirmed, advanced capitalist societies are in front of a ‘human rights paradox’ according to which one individual has received by birth the right to emigrate, as ratified in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, but not a right to immigrate (for a more in-depth discussion, see Cerami, 2010b). This has, astonishingly, occurred in spite of the undeniable fact that no ranking among ‘human rights beneficiaries’ could be conducted. It is morally and ethically impossible to justify the access to ‘inalienable’ human rights according to the location of birth of the individuals, since these ‘inalienable’ human rights are, by definition, to be applied to all individuals, regardless of income, class, gender, ethnic origin, political affiliation, sexual orientation or place of birth. Yet, as no order among human rights can be conducted (it is impossible to state, for example, that the right to sufficient food comes before the right of not being sexually abused), no list of beneficiaries (whether country nationals and third country nationals) can also be carried out.

The situation of migrants in the Russian Federation has not followed a different path from the one present in Western democracies. Here, a decrease in protection for migrant workers has been followed by an increase in social stigma. In 2006, approximately 3.5 million
labour migrants were available in the Russian labour market. Political reasons (such as escape from conflict zones) have been the main immigration motives during the first years of transition, but these have now been replaced by economic reasons (Mukomel, 2006). Social stigma is the price that new immigrants pay and this can, to a large extent, be associated with wrong immigration policies. Immigration policies in the Russian Federation have tended to exclude labour migrants from full assimilation in the society. In the Russian Federation, for example, only persons with a permanent residence permit (or a temporary permit) can have access to social security. Due to strict implementation rules, the majority of these persons remain, as a consequence, largely unprotected. To give an idea of the extent of the problem, in 2006 up to 90 percent of Russian migrant workers had no residence and/or work permits and, subsequently, could not have access even to basic social protection (Mukomel, 2006; Cerami, 2009).

With regard to the citizens’ attitudes towards migration, these have clearly worsened in recent years, with intolerance and xenophobia becoming one of the major problems, not only in Western societies, but also in post-communist countries (EUMC, 2005, 2006; Carmel et al., 2010). The case of the Russian Federation is not an exemption, with the attitudes and answers of respondents unable to be subjected to any possible misunderstanding. The majority of Russian citizens find immigration ‘bad’ (28 percent) or ‘quite bad’ (48 percent) for the economy (Figure 8) or even a threat to their cultural identity (see also Figure 7). In the Russian Federation, although no accurate information is available, the newspapers continuously report aggressions against minorities or vulnerable groups. In 2005, these corresponded to at least 28 people killed and 366 assaulted (BBC News, 2006).

**Figure 8:** Immigration Bad or Good for Country’s Economy (November 2008-April 2009)

![Immigration Bad or Good for Country’s Economy](image)

**Environmental Security**

Finally, environmental security is another key aspect for the human security concept. Here, it is important to remember that environmental hazards are not distributed equally around the globe, but affect people in different parts of the world in a different way. Due to their
geographical position, less developed countries are not simply more often subjected to envi-
ronmental catastrophes, but also more often called to pay a larger price for their economic
development, both in terms of social risks for the population as well as costs for the economy.
Developing countries are not simply less performing economies that need to minimise the
costs of their products but are also, being often situated in the southern hemisphere of the
globe, more strongly subjected to environmental changes and threats (UNDP, 2008).
The Russian Federation faces, in this context, multiple environmental challenges, both
as a highly industrialised country and as a fast growing emerging economy. To begin with,
the transition from communism to capitalism has required a substantial and still unfinished
reorganisation of the obsolete and highly polluting industrial structure. Here, industrial re-
structuring has meant, simultaneously, a difficult to implement political statement to renovate
industries making them environment- and worker- friendly, but also making the products
more competitive in international markets. Secondly, as an oil-rich country, but also as a
fast growing emerging economy, the Russian Federation is witnessing rising levels of envir-
onmental pollution, with workers often forced to work in increasingly hazardous conditions.
Thirdly, the cold climate of the country has made a reduction of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions particularly
difficult, with a substantial proportion of pollution necessarily caused by the heating of the
apartments. The numerous economic crises that have affected the Russian Federation during
the transition have also worsened a situation already very difficult, making environmental
cconcerns often second order priorities after the economic and social ones.
While CO\textsubscript{2} emissions have constantly increased in the Russian Federation in recent years,
landing the country on the list of the most polluting nations in the world after Canada, the
United States, Australia, and Saudi Arabia (UNDP, 2008), very little information, to date,
exists on the environmental concerns that this transformation is having on Russian citizens.
According to opinion polls of the Levada Center a large majority of Russian citizens finds
that the ecological situation has worsened in recent years. In 2007 approximately 63 percent
of respondents found that the ecological situation was changing for the worse against 52
percent in 2000 (quoted in Research Centre for East European Studies, 2008a, p. 9). The
only question present in the ESS database concerns the issue of whether modern science can
be relied on to solve environmental problems. Even though this question does not directly
address the real concerns of Russian citizens, it provides, at least, an indirect overview of
their feeling of trust in modern technology, which could, then, spill over in increasing requests
to governments for more environmental-friendly policies. Here, the responses of Russian
citizens are quite mixed. Not only do 27 percent ‘neither agree or disagree’ that modern
science can do something to solve environmental problems, but approximately 13 percent
of respondents also openly disagree with this statement, clearly showing an increasing pess-
imism (Figure 9).
In terms of human security, the recent situation in the Russian Federation could seem particularly worrying, if not disastrous. Here, it should, however, be remembered that the size of the country, its huge regional and ethnic differences, not to mention its internal conflicts maturated during the entire period of communism, have made a full transition towards democracy a particularly difficult process of political, economic and social restructuring.

Until the global financial crisis of 2008, the raise in oil and energy prices has helped to relieve the country from the difficulties of transition, and has also had a positive impact for the human security of citizens. However, even during this positive phase, the improvements in human security have not been homogenous, occurring in some dimensions of human security more extensively than in others. Whereas in terms of socio-economic security the conditions of Russian citizens seem to have drastically improved with more financial resources available to households, as well as to local authorities for social policies (Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 2008), this has not been the case with regard to individual liberties, political security or the rights of migrant workers, where a reduction of democratic freedoms and practices has repeatedly been observed (see discussion above).

At this point, an important question that should be addressed is to what extent can a substantial improvement in the socio-economic security of citizens be justified by so severe diminutions in other dimensions of human security, since all of these contribute, even though to a different extent, to the quality of democracy and of the life of individuals. Even though it is true that wealth and redistribution are essential elements for the democratization process and consolidation of democratic institutions (Przewoski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003; Houle, 2009), these represent only some of the very important aspects that can contribute to the long-term stability of a democracy. Other important aspects include the respect of the most
basic human rights (also for non country nationals) or the protection against raising envi-
ronmental threats which might endanger the long-term sustainable development of a nation.

CONCLUSION
The Russian Federation still shows several problems and deficiencies typical of a not fully
consolidated democracy. The transition from communism to capitalism has implied a drastic
re-organization of state-society relations of such intensity and extent that the twenty years
since the collapse of the Berlin Wall has clearly been insufficient for a consolidated democracy
to develop. The exceptional magnitude of the economic, political and social restructuring
followed by repeated, deep and potentially destabilising economic crises and conflicts have
also required strong government actions to save a country very close to collapse (see, for ex-
ample, Putin’s decisions to re-nationalise the economy, or the most recent of Medvedev’s
rescue packages implemented to contrast the negative consequences of the global financial
crisis), but these have, far too often, been conducted at the expense of democratic liberties.
Wrong policy advice from the international financial institutions, such as those concerning
an excessive emphasis on strict macro-economic stabilisation measures, has also helped to
worsen a situation already difficult. As it has been argued, economic recovery and progress
has been helped by the rise in oil and energy prices, which have produced important reper-
cussions in terms of human security. The improvement in the human security of citizens
has, however, been asymmetrical, with some dimensions of human security (notably socio-
economic security) positively benefiting from the recent structural transformations more
than others (as in the case of individual liberties, political security and migration and security).
If compared to the communist period, the overall human security situation of the country
has increased, but substantial progress still has to be done.
    Hence, this article has emphasised the importance of the human security concept especially
because of its multidimensional character. However, the need for a more symmetrical human
security development becomes even more crucial if the negative effects of the global financial
crisis are fully considered. As noted by numerous recent studies (OECD, 2009; Cerami,
2009, 2010a; Research Centre for East European Studies, 2009b), the risk is that the global
financial crisis will drastically lower the Russian Federation’s most recent social achievements
(in particular, those linked to a reduction in poverty rates or to an increase in household
consumption), ultimately affecting the continuation of the democratisation process, as well
as the consolidation of its democratic institutions recently established.

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NOTES
2 Please note that the concept of socio-economic security proposed here is substantially different from the one used by the ILO (1999) or by Prabhu (2001) which focuses on poverty and social security in the labour market.
3 GDP per capita Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (current international $) in the Russian Federation has decreased from $9139 in 1990 to $7639 in 2000. Only in recent years has it overcome the 1989 level (in 2006 GDP per capita in PPP reached $13116) (UNICEF, 2008).
4 The registered total crime rate for the Russian population increased from 1099 per 100,000 population in 1989 to 2706 in 2006 (UNICEF, 2008).
5 Even though Merkel et al. (2003) do not explicitly use the term ‘political security’ the five internal partial regimes of a democracy clearly refer to political security.
6 The most notable example here is probably given by the decision of the OSCE to boycott the 2008 presidential elections due to excessive restrictions to its country monitor experts.
7 Further information, including numerous reports, documents and briefings, can also be found at the websites of Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Transparency International and OSCE.
8 Please note that in 2009 Freedom House has included Italy in the list of deficient democracies due to the excessive power concentration of the media.
9 The most emblematic example here is the case of the chess-champion Garry Kasparov during the 2008 presidential elections.

REFERENCES


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